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Judging the Limits of Cooperative
Federalism
Eric M. Adams*

I. INTRODUCTION
I have often wondered whether the history of Canadian constitutional
law might best be taught by traversing a footbridge of metaphors. In the
“Two Row Wampum”1 of treaty relations, the “compact”2 of
Confederation, the “watertight compartments”3 and “balance”4 of the
division of powers, the “living tree”5 of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,6 and the “architecture”7 of our parliamentary structures,
Canada’s Constitution has found expression in constructs of the
imagination as much as commands of the text.8 Discerning meaning from
abstract constitutional provisions invariably requires a turn to external
*
Associate Professor, University of Alberta, Faculty of Law, and Research Fellow, Centre
for Constitutional Studies. I thank Sarah Krotz and Rachel Weary for helpful discussions, and to
Sonia Lawrence and Benjamin Berger for encouraging my participation in the Constitutional Cases
Conference.
1
John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2010), at 75-76. See also Mark Walters, “Brightening the Covenant Chain: Aboriginal Treaty
Meanings in Law and History after Marshall” (2001) 24 Dal. L.J. 75.
2
Norman Rogers, “The Compact Theory of Confederation” (1931) 9 Can. Bar Rev. 395.
On its revival as metaphor see Sébastien Grammond, “Compact is Back: The Revival of the
Compact Theory of Confederation by the Supreme Court” (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall L.J.
3
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1937] A.C. 326, at 354,
[1937] 1 D.L.R. 673 (P.C.).
4
Reference re Firearms Act, [2000] S.C.J. No. 31, 2000 SCC 31, at para. 4 (S.C.C.),
affg [1998] A.J. No. 1028, 1998 ABCA 305 (Alta. C.A.).
5
Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.), affg [1983]
A.J. No. 715, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 420 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Hunter v. Southam”] citing Edwards v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1930] A.C. 124, at 136, [1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.), revg [1928] S.C.J.
No. 19, [1928] S.C.R. 276 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Edwards”].
6
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
7
Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21, at para.
100 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6”].
8
See generally Warren J. Newman, “Of Castles and Living Trees: The Metaphorical and
Structural Constitution” (2015) 9 J. Parliamentary & Pol. L. 471 and Hugo Cyr, “Conceptual
Metaphors for an Unfinished Constitution” (2014) 19 Rev. Const. Stud. 1.
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principles and ideas to guide interpretation and to shape a larger
constitutional story of purpose.9 Metaphors, norms, unwritten principles
and narratives will always play a crucial role in constructing meaning in
Canadian constitutional law. The question is not should courts turn to
constitutional metaphors to guide constitutional interpretation — they
will and must as a function of the interpretive role demanded of them —
but rather what is the appropriate use of such metaphors in constitutional
adjudication.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recently divided decision, Quebec
(Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General),10 is the latest chapter
in a long history concerning the legal regulation of firearms in Canada, 11
but its lasting contribution to Canadian constitutional law may well be as
a battle over the meaning of cooperative federalism. At its heart, the case
poses a novel constitutional question: can federal legislation repealing an
intra vires statute itself be ultra vires? The controversy arose in response
to Parliament’s attempt to repeal portions of the Firearms Act, dismantle
its registry, and destroy its records.12 Seeking to enact a provincial
firearms registry of its own, Quebec challenged the constitutionality of
the federal law; specifically, the provisions providing for the destruction
of data in relation to Quebec firearms owners. Among its various
arguments about the ultra vires nature of the repeal scheme and Canada’s
refusal to hand over registry information, Quebec invoked the idea of
cooperative federalism as a barrier to unilateral federal action.13
Before contrasting the different conceptions of cooperative federalism
at work in the majority and dissenting judgments, this article briefly lays
out how the interpretation of constitutions, like the search for meaning
within all sets of rules, necessarily engages external, often metaphorical,
references. A brief sketch of Canadian constitutional history reveals the
ubiquity of metaphorical constitutional thought. Despite their practical
necessity in matters of constitutional interpretation, I argue nonetheless
Eric M. Adams, “Canadian Constitutional Identities” (2015) 38 Dal. L.J. 311.
[2015] S.C.J. No. 14, 2015 SCC 14 (S.C.C.), affg [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.)
[hereinafter “Quebec v. Canada”].
11
See R. Blake Brown, Arming and Disarming: A History of Gun Control in Canada
(Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2012).
12
Ending the Long-gun Registry Act, S.C. 2012 c. 6, amending the Firearms Act, S.C. 1995,
c. 39.
13
The Attorney General of Quebec argued in its factum: “Le refus du Canada est en
contradiction … des principes structuraux de la Constitution canadienne, dont celui du fédéralisme
coopératif.” Mémoire de L’Appelant, Procureur Général du Quebec et Procureur Général du
Canada, at para. 14.
9
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that constitutional metaphors have important adjudicative limits that
must be respected. The dissenting judgment in Quebec v. Canada reveals
the theoretical and practical difficulties of relying on what the dissent
calls “the spirit of co-operative federalism”14 to generate substantive
constitutional commitments. As important as metaphor is to our
conception of constitutional law, we must be careful, however “strong its
pull may be”, not to be swept “out to sea” in its rhetorical wake.15
Understanding the mechanics of metaphor and its power to lead, but also
to lead astray, may help us to adroitly steer the ship.

II. CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL METAPHORS
To apply the law to concrete cases is to interpret the meaning of words
and phrases. To account for the inherent indeterminacy of language, the
common law has developed practices of interpretation that look to overall
purpose, background context, and extra-textual principles to determine
precise and particular meaning when applying statutory or judicial
language to real circumstances.16 Interpreting the meaning of vehicle in
light of a particular legal purpose is necessary, for example, to determine
which vehicles are truly banned from the park — cars, strollers, or military
monuments — to borrow the famous examples from the Hart-Fuller
debate.17 If reliance on purpose, context, and principle is necessary in
interpreting statutes, the need is even more pronounced in constitutional
law. Constitutions, necessarily drafted “with an eye to the future”, are
especially abstract and indeterminate in order to provide “a continuing
framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power”.18 In order
to endure and to enhance its legitimacy as supreme law, a constitution must
be capable of governing the unanticipated, the changed and the new.
Drafters select abstract constitutional language and concepts — think of
property, equality, or unreasonable delay — to apply broadly to future
developments and, in doing so, create possibilities for multiple meanings,
divergent paths, and different outcomes. External references to larger
animating ideas, ideals and purposes provide context in order to narrow the
14

Supra, note 10, at para. 149.
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, 2011 SCC 66, at para. 62 (S.C.C.).
16
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] S.C.J. No. 2, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27 at para. 21
(S.C.C.), varg [1995] O.J. No. 586 (Ont. C.A.); Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, supra,
note 7, at para. 63.
17
Fred Schauer “A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park” (2008) 83 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1109.
18
Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 5, at 155.
15

30

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d)

ranges of acceptable meanings in order to determine, for instance, whether
a constitution envisages substantive or formal equality in the entrenchment
of equality rights. In this respect, constitutional metaphors are a compass
to assist in reading the map of constitutional text. As a character in Zia
Haider Rahman’s recent novel observes, “when the ancients saw clusters
of stars in the sky, they joined them up in an order that evoked a shape they
already recognized, something that held a meaning for them, and into this
configuration they read properties of the celestial night.”19 Like ancients
gazing at the night sky, judges interpret the meaning of constitutions by
finding constellations of meaningful and familiar forms.
The judicial impulse to look to constitutional metaphor — to connect
constitutional provisions to external images and larger systems of
understanding — goes well beyond the practicalities of legal interpretation.
Metaphorical thinking and expression appears intrinsic to human thought
and speech alike. “[M]etaphor,” I.A. Richards reminds us in his classic
study, “is the omnipresent principle of language”.20 “[M]etaphor is
pervasive in everyday life”, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson elaborate,
“not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual
system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally
metaphorical in nature.”21 Forming associations and patterns between the
concrete and the abstract, Steven Pinker argues, is intrinsic to language,
and to rational and creative human thought itself.22 “Metaphor”, Jeffery
Donaldson agrees, “is both a form and a process. Like electricity, it is not
so much a thing as the way things behave … . [I]t is the root and manner
of imaginative thinking.”23 Given the imperatives of lawyers and judges
not only to interpret, but also to defend those interpretations and
19

Zia Haider Rahman, In the Light of What We Know (New York: Picardor, 2014), at 40.
I.A. Richards, The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), at 92
[hereinafter “Richards”].
21
George Lakoff & Mark Johnson, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1980), at 3 [hereinafter “Lakoff & Johnson”].
22
Steven Pinker, How the Mind Works (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 1997). As Pinker
explains elsewhere, “Conceptual metaphors point to an obvious way in which people could learn to
reason about new, abstract concepts. They would notice … a parallel between a physical realm they
already understand and a conceptual realm they don’t yet understand.” Emphasizing the ability to
make and comprehend metaphor as a key evolutionary step in human intelligence, Pinker asks us to
imagine the power when the mental mechanics of basic reasoning “cut themselves loose from actual
hunks of matter … . The cognitive machinery that computes relations among things, places, and
causes could then be co-opted for abstract ideas. The ancestry of abstract thinking would be visible
in concrete metaphors, a kind of cognitive vestige.” The Stuff of Thought: Language as a Window
Into Human Nature (New York: Penguin, 2007), at 241-42.
23
Jeffery Donaldson, Missing Link: The Evolution of Metaphor and the Metaphor of
Evolution (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2015), at 9.
20
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persuade others of them, it is no surprise that metaphor — with its
succinct ability to capture and convey an idea visually, creatively and
memorably — often plays a central role in law as in all rhetorical fields.
The need for judges to invoke larger animating ideas and principles in
division of powers jurisprudence — often expressed metaphorically —
was apparent from the outset. In Parsons, still cited for its influential
definitions of property and civil rights and trade and commerce, Sir
Montague Smith conceded that the literal meaning of the words of
sections 91(2) and 92(13) alone could not provide an answer.24 Rather, he
averred, constitutional interpretation must draw meaning from what he
later termed the “general scheme of the British North America Act”25 and
the larger purposes and legislative intentions that it evidenced.26 The
meaning and scope of individual heads of power could only be realized
when understood collectively as a system, a division of powers, a
federalism in which each head of power must exist in combination with
the others. Interpretations of particular heads of power came to
presuppose the continued and essential existence of the other heads of
power in order to protect an essential balance of both federal and
provincial power.
It was precisely the spirit of that overall federal scheme that supported
the Privy Council’s confident assertion in Hodge that the “true character
and position of the provincial legislatures” was one of coordinate
autonomy and equal supremacy to that of the federal government.27 In
the period before the Privy Council’s vilification at the hands of
progressive nationalists like Bora Laskin and Frank Scott,28 its
federalism jurisprudence was praised by Canada’s leading constitutional
scholar and historian, W.P.M. Kennedy, for “gradually bringing to light
the essentially federal nature of the Canadian Constitution”, and for
“humanizing” the Constitution “with the elasticity of life”.29 Interpreting
the constitutional division of powers has always signalled more than a
mechanical allocation of power: it expressed and drew upon an abstract
idea and ideal of Canada; a lens through which the provisions of the text
24

Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1881), 7 App. Cas. 96 (P.C.).
Russell v. The Queen (1882), 7 App. Cas. 829, at 836 (P.C.).
26
Supra, note 24.
27
Hodge v. The Queen (1883), 9 App. Cas. 117, at 132 (P.C.).
28
R.C.B. Risk, “The Scholars and the Constitution: POGG and the Privy Council” in
R.C.B. Risk, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected Essays, G. Blaine Baker & J. Phillips,
eds. (Toronto: The Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2006), at 233.
29
W.P.M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada: An Introduction to its Development and
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1922), at 422, 431.
25
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could be read with greater clarity; a constitutional ideal that eventually
found succinct expression in the metaphor of balance.
On many occasions, the broader constitutional ideas judges turned to
found their greatest resonance when framed as metaphors. Lord Sankey
did so most famously in declaring that the Constitution had “planted in
Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural
limits”30 just a few years before Lord Atkin reminded that the “ship of
state” still retained “the watertight compartments which are an essential
part of her original structure”.31 Whether in approbation or derision, both
images have proved indelible in Canadian constitutional law and culture.
It is the metaphors that we remember and quote after the particular facts
and holdings of the cases that gave rise to them have faded. Indeed, the
particular power of such metaphors gave Lord Sankey pause. In the
Aeronautics Reference, though he again insisted that constitutional
interpretation required consideration of the “foundation upon which the
whole structure was subsequently erected”, he cautioned that there was
“always a danger that in the course of this process the terms of the statute
may come to be unduly extended and attention diverted from what has
been enacted to what has been judicially said about the enactment.”32
This tension between constitutional words on the page and constitutional
images in the mind has been an enduring dynamic in Canadian
constitutional law. The challenge, as it turns out, has not been in
conjuring a suitable roster of constitutional metaphors, but in controlling
their capacity to reshape the constitutional text from which they emerge.
As we have seen, the division of powers already possessed basic
normative content by the time the term “federalism” itself began to
appear in Canadian legal decisions. Perhaps not surprisingly, Rand J. was
the first to use the expression in any Canadian court (although use of the
term federalism had been common in constitutional scholarship and the
political science literature for decades). In Saumur, Rand J. opined that
legislation must be “sufficiently definite and precise to indicate its
subject matter” in order for courts to determine its constitutionality.
“That principle”, he noted, “inheres in the nature of federalism;
otherwise, authority, in broad and general terms, could be conferred

30

Edwards, supra, note 5, at 136.
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ontario (Attorney General), supra, note 3, at para. 15.
32
Reference Re Regulations and Control of Aeronautics, [1932] A.C. 54, [1932] 1 D.L.R.
58, at 70 (P.C.), revg [1930] S.C.J. No. 35 (S.C.C.).
31
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which would end the division of powers.”33 Federalism, in addition to
creating relations between levels of government, also operated as a check
on potential governmental abuse of power. Justice Rand extended this
conception of federalism in the implied bill of rights jurisprudence in the
decade that followed. In a series of cases, Rand J. framed the Canadian
Constitution as a “pattern of limitations, curtailments and modifications”
designed to protect a never fully defined roster of individual rights and
freedoms.34 Although the substantive contributions of Rand J.’s implied
bill of rights never fully took hold and were certainly eclipsed by the
Charter, the language of federalism did survive, a permanent reflection of
the idea that the division of powers embodied a larger vision of
democracy, diversity and good governance.
While the prominent place of unwritten principles in the Secession
Reference surprised many observers, the identification of federalism
among the four foundational features of constitutionalism recognized by
the Court did not. “The principle of federalism”, the Court explained,
“recognizes the diversity of the component parts of Confederation, and
the autonomy of provincial governments” while facilitating “democratic
participation by distributing power to the government thought to be most
suited to achieving the particular societal objective having regard to this
diversity.”35 Those values, the Court argued, although not altogether
visible in “the written provisions of the Constitution”, provided the
“light” by which the text should be interpreted.36
But federalism has always been capable of an array of descriptive and
normative qualities, its precise calibration of powers subject to
reasonable disagreement. Even apart from the often different shades of
meaning and characteristics of federalism in scholarship and political
thought emanating from English and French Canada, political scientists
have described a range of different kinds of federalism (open,
asymmetrical, executive, collaborative, to name only a few), each with
33
Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] S.C.J. No. 49, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299, at 333 (S.C.C.),
revg [1952] B.R. 475 ext (Que. Q.B.). A year later, Rand J. held: “The mutilation by a province of a
federal undertaking is obviously not to be tolerated in our scheme of federalism”: Campbell-Bennett
Ltd. v. Comstock Midwestern Ltd., [1954] S.C.J. No. 14, [1954] S.C.R. 207, at 216 (S.C.C.), affg
[1953] 3 D.L.R. 594 (B.C.C.A.).
34
Switzman v. Elbling, [1957] S.C.J. No. 13, [1957] S.C.R. 285, at 303 (S.C.C.), revg [1954]
B.R. 421 (Que. Q.B.). See generally, Eric M. Adams “Building a Law of Human Rights: Roncarelli
v. Duplessis in Canadian Constitutional Culture” (2010) 55 McGill L.J. 437.
35
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para. 58
(S.C.C.).
36
Id., at para. 55.
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distinct properties and political ramifications.37 Into this complex of
labels emerged the idea of “cooperative federalism”, a genial-sounding
description premised on federal and provincial governments working
collectively to achieve mutual policy objectives. It did not take long for
cooperative federalism to migrate from descriptive political science into
normative constitutional law. Others have well canvassed the concept’s
introduction and rise to prominence, starting with Laskin C.J.C.’s
response to an intervener argument in the Anti-Inflation Reference that
“[c]o-operative federalism may be consequential upon a lack of federal
legislative power, but it is not a ground for denying it.”38 In the 40 years
since, Laskin C.J.C.’s instinct that cooperative federalism was simply a
matter of legislative practicalities and not law has been difficult to
sustain. While continuing to recognize that much of the nature of the
relationship between the federal and provincial governments lies beyond
judicial concern, the Supreme Court also recognizes that “constitutional
doctrine must facilitate, not undermine what this Court has called ‘cooperative federalism’”.39 In Reference re Securities Act, a unanimous
Court noted that the growing “practice” of “seeking cooperative
solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as well as its
constituent parts” had become the “animating force” of the “federalism
principle upon which Canada’s constitutional framework rests”.40 Indeed,
Hugo Cyr argues that Canadian federalism in any meaningful sense must
be synonymous with cooperative federalism.41 “Today’s constitutional
landscape”, Abella J. writes, “is painted with the brush of co-operative
federalism.”42
Less obviously than living trees and watertight compartments,
cooperative federalism is a metaphor too. Federalism — itself an
37
On various stages and types of federal arrangements in the post-war period see David
Cameron & Richard Simeon, “Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of
Collaborative Federalism” (2002) 32:2 Publius: The Journal of Federalism 49.
38
Re: Anti-Inflation Act (Canada), [1976] S.C.J. No. 12, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, at 421
(S.C.C.). See Wade Kenneth Wright, Beyond Umpire and Arbiter: Courts as Facilitators of
Intergovernmental Dialogue in Division of Powers Cases in Canada (S.J.D. Thesis, Columbia
University, 2014) [unpublished]; Warren J. Newman, “The Promise and Limits of Cooperative
Federalism as a Constitutional Principle” in B. Berger & S. Lawrence, eds., Constitutional Cases 2015
(2016) 76 S.C.L.R. (2d) 67.
39
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, at para. 24 (S.C.C.),
affg [2005] A.J. No. 21 (Alta. C.A.).
40
Reference re Securities Act, supra, note 15, at paras. 132-33.
41
Hugo Cyr, “Autonomy, Subsidiarity, Solidarity: Foundations of Cooperative Federalism”
(2014) 23 Const. Forum Const. 20.
42
NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’
Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, 2010 SCC 45, at para. 67 (S.C.C.), affg [2008] B.C.J. No. 1611 (B.C.C.A.).
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abstraction of an allocation of powers to different levels of government
— is neither cooperative nor uncooperative. It just is. Describing
federalism as cooperative personifies it with human characteristics —
acts of agency, kindness, consideration, mutuality, respect. It animates
the inert with life while reframing the concrete (federalism) with an
evocative external image (cooperation). As Lakoff and Johnson explain,
personifications, as a subset of metaphor, “make sense of phenomena in
the world in human terms — terms that we can understand on the basis
of our own motivations, goals, actions, and characteristics.”43 The word
metaphor is itself metaphorical. Derived from the Greek, metaphor
means “to ferry over” — and the transportation of meanings is what an
apt metaphor can so brilliantly and succinctly accomplish.44 “[T]he
greatest thing by far,” Aristotle writes, “is to be a master of metaphor. …
since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in
dissimilars.”45 Metaphor does more than simply recognize existing
similarities. More powerfully, in many cases “the metaphor creates the
similarity”.46 A constitution, quite obviously, is not a tree at all, but it
seems more like a living tree after it is called one. This power of making
meaning means that, in the constitutional context, metaphors must be
approached with care. This is not a call to dispense with constitutional
metaphors, but rather to fully respect them. To do so means paying closer
attention to how they operate, and the role of their components in
constitutional analysis.
In addition to noting the ubiquity and salience of metaphor,
philosophers and literary theorists have long recognized that metaphors
consist of two essential parts. These two parts have gone by a variety of
labels, perhaps most influentially I.A. Richards’ description of the tenor
and vehicle.47 The tenor operates as the principal subject, the vehicle as
the object or idea of comparison. In constitutional metaphor, a particular
constitutional provision or feature (or, at times, the entire constitution
itself) serves as the tenor, the image of comparison as the vehicle. In the
metaphor that our Constitution is a living tree, the Constitution is the
tenor and the tree is the vehicle. The danger foreseen by Lord Sankey
43

Lakoff & Johnson, supra, note 21, at 34.
Stephen Adams, Poetic Designs: An Introduction to Meters Verse Forms and Figures of
Speech (Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2003), at 133.
45
Aristotle, Poetics (London: Aeterna Press, 2015), at 22.
46
Max Black, “Metaphor” (1954-55) 55 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 273, at 285
[emphasis in original].
47
Richards, supra, note 20, at 97.
44
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was that in subsequent cases, lawyers and judges would come to focus on
the meaning, scope and import of the vehicle at the expense of the tenor.
Imagine a case in which in trying to determine whether a particular
enactment was part of the Constitution, a court became concerned with
whether or not the enactment metaphorically resembled the branch of a
tree. Cooperation may be a useful way to understand the ideal qualities
of federalism, but judges will fall into error if, in attempting to apply
the division of powers, they insist on a precondition of cooperation.
To do so switches the constitutional focus from tenor to vehicle. As I have
argued, constitutional metaphors are indispensable for understanding
constitutional text, but it is essential that the separation between text and
its guiding metaphorical images remain robust. Judicial review, as La
Forest J. reminded, “is politically legitimate only insofar as it involves
the interpretation of an authoritative constitutional instrument” and not,
application of the vehicle of a constitutional metaphor.48

III. COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN QUEBEC V. CANADA
The nature and adjudicative impact of cooperative federalism occupies a
central place in the decisions at all levels of court in Quebec’s constitutional
challenge to Parliament’s Ending the Long-gun Registry Act.49 At the outset
of the constitutional analysis in the trial decision, Blanchard J. writes that “to
facilitate ‘cooperative federalism’, the constitutional boundaries underlying
the division of powers must prevail so as not to erode the constitutional
balance between federal and provincial powers.”50 Noting that in the
Secession Reference the Supreme Court held that “underlying constitutional
principles may in certain circumstances give rise to substantial legal
obligations, which constitute substantial limitations upon government
action,” Blanchard J. opined that “one of the keys to resolving this dispute
can be found in the answer to the following question: Does the fact that
Canada has announced that it wishes to prevent Quebec from using the
[federal gun registry] data violate these principles?”51 Drawing particular
attention to statements in Parliament by Ministers of the Crown, including
the Prime Minister, indicating an “avowed intention” to prevent other levels
48
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of Prince Edward Island,
[1997] S.C.J. No. 75, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 315 (S.C.C.), revg [1995] M.J. No. 170 (Man. C.A.).
49
S.C. 2012, c. 6.
50
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] J.Q. no 8319, 2012
QCCS 4202, at para. 53 (Que. S.C.), revd [2013] J.Q. no 6676 (Que. C.A.).
51
Id., at paras. 95, 97.
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of government to establish gun registries, the trial judge found a direct
interference with the principles of cooperative federalism. “Since the
Supreme Court of Canada has urged Canadian legislators to adopt a flexible
and cooperative approach to federalism based on pragmatic lawmaking”,
Blanchard J. concludes, “it is clear that … Parliament has acted in direct
opposition to this teaching.”52 Cooperative federalism, in Blanchard J.’s
handling, provides more than interpretive guidance, but also supplies direct
substantive obligations. On the basis of the breach of those obligations, as
well as his characterization of the pith and substance of the federal
legislation as a colourable invasion of property and civil rights, Blanchard J.
found the provision of the federal enactment purporting to destroy firearms
records from Quebec ultra vires and of no force and effect. He ordered
Canada to transfer specific gun registry data to Quebec within 30 days.
A unanimous bench of five judges of the Quebec Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal.53 In doing so, the Court of Appeal took an entirely
different view of the role of cooperative federalism in division of powers
cases. On the more direct question of the legislation’s constitutionality,
the Court of Appeal held that the repeal of valid federal legislation and
the destruction of records created under it must, by definition, equally
fall within federal jurisdiction. “Since the impugned Act does nothing
more than abolish a scheme that was constitutionally valid”, the Court
reasoned, “it cannot encroach any further on provincial jurisdiction than
did the statute that created and implemented the scheme in the first
place.”54 That such federal action was impolitic, wasteful and
inconvenient to a province was of no constitutional moment. “If there is
a price to be paid for enacting a statute that could engender pointless
costs for another level of government”, the judges held, “it is to be paid
at the polling booths and not before the courts.”55 The Court specifically
rejected the trial judge’s conception and use of cooperative federalism.
“As a principle of interpretation”, the Court held, “it cannot, in itself,
Id., at para. 144. “The Court emphasizes that it is not rendering a political judgment”,
Blanchard J. clarified in anticipation of criticism, “as it has no authority to do so. Rather, it states a
legal observation based on Canadian constitutional legal rules and principles” (at para. 145).
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Canada (Attorney General) v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2013] J.Q. no 6676, 2013
QCCA 1138 (Que. C.A.), affd [2015] S.C.J. No. 14 (S.C.C.).
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Id., at para. 49.
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Id., at para. 35. Echoing Major J.’s admonishment a decade earlier that “the appellants’
arguments fail to recognize that in a constitutional democracy such as ours, protection from
legislation that some might view as unjust or unfair properly lies not in the amorphous underlying
principles of our Constitution, but in its text and the ballot box.” British Columbia v. Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd, [2005] S.C.J. No. 50, 2005 SCC 49, at para. 66 (S.C.C.), affg [2004] B.C.J. No. 1007
(B.C.C.A.).
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modify the division of powers. … Only the provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1867 dividing areas of jurisdiction between Parliament and the
provincial legislatures can ground a judgment of constitutional invalidity
based on the division of powers.”56 For the Quebec Court of Appeal,
cooperative federalism might be an important principle of Canadian
constitutional law, but that did not transform it into a set of enforceable
constitutional obligations, the breach of which gave rise to constitutional
remedies.
Quebec’s appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada also turned on the
Court’s understanding of cooperative federalism and its limits. The
majority and dissenting judgments part company on the extent and
ramifications of the federal-provincial partnership involved in the federal
gun registry, but also set out two distinct visions of cooperative federalism
and its operation in Canadian constitutional law. My focus is on the latter
divergence. I begin with the dissent authored by LeBel, Wagner and
Gascon JJ. joined in concurrence by Abella J. The dissent is notable for
unifying all three of the Court’s members appointed from Quebec, a fact
which might suggest a greater and more troubling schism along provincial
lines if it were not for the unanimous judgment of five judges of the
Quebec Court of Appeal which disagreed with them. Emphasizing that the
degree of administrative integration and cooperation among governments
in the creation, maintenance, and use of the long gun registry created a
“novel circumstance”, the dissent held that “our analysis must be guided
by the Constitution’s unwritten principles”, particularly, “the principle of
federalism and its modern form — co-operative federalism.”57 Given that
cooperative federalism “reflects the realities of an increasingly complex
society that requires the enactment of coordinated federal and provincial
legislative schemes”, the dissenting judges stated that “our courts must
protect such schemes both when they are implemented and when they are
dismantled.”58 In short, if cooperative federalism made the scheme
possible in the first place, then only by complying with the spirit of
cooperative federalism may such an arrangement be repealed.
Although the dissent ultimately employed a traditional division of
powers analysis utilizing — pith and substance, classification and the
ancillary doctrine to ground its decision,59 significant portions of the
56

Id., at para. 52.
Supra, note 10, at para. 151.
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Id., at paras. 148, 152.
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See Paul Daly, “Dismantling Regulatory Structures: Canada’s Long-Gun Registry as
Case Study” (2014) 33 N.J.C.L. 169.
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judgment appear to join with the trial judge in elevating cooperative
federalism into a substantive constitutional obligation: to hold governments
to a constitutional duty to act cooperatively. The precise parameters of that
obligation and its requirements are somewhat unclear, but the dissent states
that “the dismantling of a partnership … must be carried out in a manner that
is compatible with the principle of federalism that underlies our
Constitution.”60 Elaborating slightly, the dissent suggests that “a cooperative scheme from which both the federal and provincial governments
benefit cannot be dismantled unilaterally by one of the parties without taking
the impact of such a decision on its partner’s heads of power into account.”61
This obligation attaches even in situations, as in this case, without the
presence of an interlocking legislative scheme where both levels of
government are exercising valid legislative authority under the double aspect
doctrine.
In what follows I raise several concerns with using cooperative
federalism in this manner, not the least of which is the absence of authority
for such obligations in the division of powers themselves. In addition to
diverting judicial attention from constitutional text to constitutional
metaphor, the principle of cooperative federalism provides no workable or
predictable standard of enforcement and muddies the separation of powers.
Ironically, its increased use judicially may also have the perverse incentive
of reducing cooperation politically.
Judges will not be able to adjudicate in any predictable fashion a
constitutional duty to act cooperatively, and will tend to extend them beyond
their appropriate role under the separation of powers.62 What actions give
rise to the breach of the duty of cooperative federalism or are required to
satisfy its terms? The answer to either question is uncertain and probably
unknowable. The dissent only suggests that legislatures take “into account
the reasonably foreseeable consequences” on the other level of government,
or that governments “be aware of the impact of that legislation or provision
on the other partner’s exercise of its powers” in order to be judged to have
60

Quebec v. Canada, supra, note 10, at para. 153 [emphasis added].
Id., at para. 154.
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There is, perhaps, a telling slip in para. 154, supra, note 10, of the dissent. In noting the
necessity of protecting the “constitutional balance that protects the principle of federalism”, the
dissenters write: “The concern here is not to alter the separation of powers in our Constitution
through the application of co-operative federalism, but to ensure that it is respected.” I think it
almost certain that the sentence should refer to the “division of powers” rather than the separation of
powers. The irony is that the strict judicial enforcement of cooperative federalism while potentially
solicitous of a particular vision of federalism does undermine the separation of powers, an equally
crucial unwritten principle of Canadian constitutional law.
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acted cooperatively.63 Constitutional standards overly reliant on other
(equally imprecise) abstractions tend not to yield predictable or satisfying
jurisprudence, as the experience with employing the infringement of human
dignity within the legal test for equality rights under section 15 of the
Charter illustrated.64 Judging whether such standards are met proves
unworkably subjective, and, more problematically in this instance, will
compel judges to evaluate an array of political behaviours, policy choices
and intergovernmental relationships best left to the exclusive domain of the
political process.
Faced with the prospect of being unable to alter or repeal a scheme
judged to trigger these additional constitutional duties, governments may
choose to forgo administrative cooperation in the first place to avoid
limitations on their future legislative capacities.65 Although the dissent
proceeds on the assumption that such cooperative arrangements are rare,
information sharing and coordination across government administrative
schemes seems only likely to increase. Indeed, the rise of cooperative
federalism as an interpretive doctrine was premised on making such
coordination possible in order to deal with the overlapping realities of
many subjects demanding legislative attention. Perhaps in its particulars
the federal gun registry was “novel”, but the regulation of firearms is
hardly unique in its engagement of multiple levels of government
jurisdiction. From health care and education, to transportation and
scientific research, to labour mobility and environmental standards, it is
difficult to think of many subjects that do not possess both national and
local dimensions, and which might not benefit from administrative
regulation drawing upon multiple levels of government involvement.
Data collected under the authority of intra vires legislation dealing with
these subjects will almost always be of use or benefit to the other level of
government.66 The dissent’s substantive conception of cooperative
federalism suggests a diminished capacity of government to control the
data of their valid administrative schemes wherever there has been
cooperation in collecting it. The dissent raises the prospect of a troubling
legislative vacuum, a situation in which such data could not be fully
63
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controlled by either level of government. Cooperative federalism arose
specifically to deal with the fact of overlapping constitutional powers and
subjects of governmental concern that spanned both provincial and
federal jurisdictions. Accordingly, courts developed an approach to
federalism and its doctrines (pith and substance, paramountcy, ancillary
and interjurisdictional immunity) which, instead of rigidly policing
boundaries between levels of government, came to accept the exercise of
legislative jurisdiction that might have impacts within the other level of
government’s jurisdiction. The dissent proposes a substantive conception
of cooperative federalism which transforms its function from enabling
the exercise of jurisdiction to fundamentally impairing it.
The majority reasons of Cromwell and Karakatsanis JJ. (with support
from McLachlin C.J.C., and Rothstein and Moldaver JJ.), appear alive to
several of these concerns. For the majority, cooperative federalism
describes a fact about concurrency, and exists as a principle that gives
rise to a permissive flexibility when interpreting the scope of sections 91
and 92.67 In this view, cooperative federalism is a ripple in the surf of the
dominant tide of federalism. Suggesting that a different result may attend
to “a truly interlocking federal-provincial legislative framework”, the
majority held that nothing in the nature of the particular scheme at issue
or in cooperative federalism generally impaired the ability of the federal
government to destroy records created under its legislative authority,
even though some of those records had been produced with assistance
from other levels of government.68 “The principle of cooperative
federalism”, the majority held, “cannot be seen as imposing limits on the
otherwise valid exercise of legislative competence.”69 In emphasizing
instead the primacy of the written constitutional text, the majority
stressed that cooperative federalism could not mandate an obligation on
governments to cooperate, be cooperative, or prohibit actions which
might hinder cooperation. Beyond the flexible constitutional strictures
imposed by sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the
majority implied, relations between governments (cordial or aggressive,
magnanimous or obstreperous) were political matters to be executed and
evaluated by other actors (politicians and public servants, media and
voters) within Canada’s constitutional culture. Voters can and do reward
67
Of course, a unanimous Supreme Court has also stressed that a flexible and permissive
interpretation of the division of powers cannot overwrite the jurisdictional lines that do and must
exist between the various heads of power: Reference re Securities Act, supra, note 15.
68
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and punish the behaviour of governments, including on the basis of
perceptions of government relations within the federation. The constitutional
freedom to act uncooperatively may, in fact, yield the best protection of
cooperative federalism in the form of electoral punishment and reward
from the voting public.

IV. CONCLUSION
It is possible that the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in Rogers
Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay,70 reveals that the gap in the
approach to cooperative federalism between the majority and the dissent
may have since narrowed. Writing for a majority of eight justices,
Wagner and Côté JJ. agreed with Gascon J.’s partially concurring reasons
that “when the courts apply the various constitutional doctrines, they
must take into account the principle of co-operative federalism, which
favours, where possible, the concurrent operation of statutes enacted by
governments at both levels.”71 Citing Quebec v. Canada, however, the
majority emphasized that cooperative federalism “can neither override
nor modify the division of powers itself. It cannot be seen as imposing
limits on the valid exercise of legislative authority.”72 Justice Gascon
alone appeared to argue for a more substantive conception of cooperative
federalism capable of curbing the exercise of jurisdictional authority.73 In
retrospect, the dissent in Quebec v. Canada may stand as the high-water
mark in the use of cooperative federalism to reshape the division of
powers and their constitutional adjudication in its image.
And yet we would not want to live in a world without constitutional
metaphors like cooperative federalism. To be governed by the rule of law
is to live by the power of words and imagination, and the words of the
Constitution, as we have seen, often take shape and meaning with the use
of contextual metaphors. Constitutional metaphors serve a functional
purpose too — to make law memorable, relatable and intelligible, not
only to its practitioners but to the broader public as well. And, as I have
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argued, constitutional metaphors and other external references provide
judges and political actors with the guidance required to select among
interpretive alternatives. This is not to say that constitutional metaphors
are always equally useful or germane. Their emergence and ascendancy,
like their downfall, reflect moments in time in our constitutional culture
and law, just as they help to shape and produce that law and culture. Like
other features in our constitutional life they are contestable and contested,
shifting and changeable. Particular metaphors will come and go as they
form, change shape, break up, and recede as winter ice on the lake.
Cooperative federalism has captured political and legal imaginations
alike. From Laskin C.J.C.’s initial offhand reference, to its dominant
position as a guiding principle in division of powers jurisprudence today,
cooperative federalism appealingly combines several aspirational goals:
equal and coordinate levels of government, flexible and permissive
interpretation of the division of powers, and respectful cooperation in
service of collective goals. Perhaps because of its particular allure we need
to be careful not to mistake the compass for the map, the constellations for
the stars, the vehicle for the tenor in our constitutional analysis. As useful
and necessary as external references are to constitutional navigation, it is
the text that must continue to define judicially enforced constitutional
obligations. The Canadian Constitution is, of course, more than inscribed
words on the page, but its broader life, culture, and principles — its
underlying ideas and their metaphors — are the avenues of negotiation,
politics and pluralism of a healthy democracy. “If human rights and
harmonious relations between cultures are forms of the beautiful”, the poet
and constitutional scholar Frank Scott wrote, “then the state is a work of
art that is never finished.”74 Constitutional metaphors are destined to
remain an integral part of Canada’s constitutional canvas. So too must
vigilance that they not dominate the painting.
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